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Abstract. On what grounds can we conclude that an act of categor@tion isbiased?
In this chapter. 1t is contended that in the absence of objective nomls of what
categorles actually are. biases in categorizatiOn can only be specified in relation to
theoreticalunderstand~s of categorization. Therefore. the chapter startswith an
overview of current theoretical positions regarding categorization. and the various
constraints on learning and using categories that are specified by these theories.
Several types of categorization bias follow from these descriptions. In this conteXt.
the role of prototypes, basic level categories. existing schemata, category width.
conteXt. feature frequency and correlation among features is discussed. as weIl as the
bias~ influence of selective attention. hypothesis test~ and task demands.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 On categories and reality
This discus sion of biases in categoiization Will be preceded by
a consideration of the question of whether biases in this area can be
established at all. When can we statethat an act of categorization is
biased? Biases are defined as systematic error, or the difference
between judgments and the true value (e.g. Anderson et aL, 1981)'.
In order 10 be able to claim that an observed categorlzation behavior
is biased, it is therefore necessary to Specify what categoiies, in
reality. are like. However, features, objects and events of the real
world can be categorized in an endless number of ways. Besides,
Dur perception is highly selective and thus biased already. Which
features we do perceive will be influenced by factors like for
instance Dur physical ability to perceive them, and by Dur needs, our
motives and prior knowiedge, as represented in Dur cognitivesystem.
It is at present Widely assumed that categories arise from
interaction between events in the world and the perceiver With his
own prior knowiedge. The perceiver, in making sense out of the
stimuli of the world, has his or her own contiibution to the resulting
representation of the world. As McCauley (1987) states, from their
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mental constructs or modeIs, people aften impose categories on the
world of their experience rather than induce them from this world,
although same categories seem to have an ecological basis toa. It is
important to recognize that human categorization behavior is heavily
dependent on the cognitive constructs, the models that are built up
during a lifetime of experience. Specifying the real world as it is,
not as we perceive and represent it, is simply beyond Dur reach.
So in the case of categorization, the norm bas to be a question
of theory, because there is no way of being sure that the real world
is structured as we perceive it, with categories existing a priori.
Perception of the world is constrained by Dur mental constructs,
which in turn influence Dur categorization performance. However,
there are a variety of theories and models on categorization, and
although there se ems to be same consensus about which theories
have to be abandoned by now, within these constraints there is
much less consensus about the appropriate description of human
categorization behavior. An example on the issue of prototype
effects may serve to illustrate this. As we shall see in the next
paragraph, from a classical point of view, a1l members of a category
should be as representative of the category as any other. This
follows from the assumption that the norm for category membership
is sufficiently specified lust by the presence or absence of a set of
defining features. Allother features, even if they are representative
of the category, are considered irrelevant, and this makes all
category members equivalent. However, advances in Dur
understanding of categorization have made it clear that in many
categories differences in typicality do exist among category
exemplars. People do not judge all category members as equally
representative of their category. Thus, systematic departures
appear to occur from the definition of what constitutes a category in
a classical point of view. However, in a prototype conception
typicality effects are not biases in this sense. In this view they are in
the care assumption of the theory, as will be outlined below.
Prototype views are specially devised to account for typicality
effects, trying to capture why it is that membership is a matter of
degree. So, in the process of theoretical development,
categorization behavior that appeared to be biased may prove to be
unbiased given another theoretical understanding. Theoretical
development keeps going on. Again, the issue of typicality effects
may illustrate this. Typicality effects, in a still more recent
theoretical account, are considered as phenomena that are not
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necessarily relevant to categorization. It is contended that they
need not show something direct about the nature of categorization.
They are superficial effe cts that do not always mirror category
structure directly. Prototype effects may result from many sources,
and are to be accounted for in terms of deviations from one's
cognitive models or "theories" for understanding the world (Lakoff,
1986). We shall return to this view later.
The point here is that misinterpretations, or at least different
kinds of interpretations of categorization behavior, continue to
occur, due to an incomplete understanding of all the types of
categories that occur, and to a lack of knowledge regarding all
aspects of influence on categorization. One of the important aspects
is people!s prior knowIedge. Another point to mention is that in
categorization modeIs, tasks and situations have not received much
attention. They have nearly always implicitly been considered to be
homogeneous. That is, models usually do not predict different
categorization behavior in different tasks and contexts. It is true,
however, that tasks as weIl as situations do influence categorization,
as will be shown in this chapter.
In sum, absolute or clearly established standards, from which
departures can be described, unfortunately do not seem to be at
hand. However, there is a sense in which biases in categorization
can be specified. It is obvious that there are a variety of potential
groupings of the things in the world around us. Likewise, there are
many potential ways of representing such groupings, and ways of
deciding on group membership. An important question, therefore,
is which ones are actually done or preferred by us and which ones
are not. Preferential biases can be studied experimentally by
investigating constraints in human categorization activities. To this
goal, designing experimental categories so as to exclude ambiguous
interpretations of categorization behavior can be profitable.
Preferred ways of categorizing win provide important clues as to
bath the underlying structure and the process of categorization. For
instance, people may show a "bias" faVOring correlated features, as
was suggested by Rosch (1978). Directing attention towards certain
features and away from others can be another source of bias,
pertaining to what features are represented when a category is
learned. Or people mayor may not consider the occurrence of
features in contrast categories when making a categorization
decision. If biases in categorization are conceived of as preferential
ways of learning and using categories, bath these ways and the
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factors of influence on them have to be described. As pointed out in
this opening paragraph. it should be kept in mind that this
conception of biases ultimately boils down to presenting a
descriptive theory of human categorization behavior. Despite that.
the approach that is taken in this chapter is not to present a full
theory of categorization. but rather to describe biases as constraints
with which models should not be inconsistent.
Bearing this understanding of biases in mind. we shall deal
with the subject of categorization in general flrst. and then turn to a
discussion of a number of important biases in this matter. It is our
theoretical point of view that biases can result from limitations on
aspects of category information that are stored in memory. or from
computational constraints whenever that categorical knowledge is
used. Both aspects will be considered in this chapter.
1.2 Categorization
One of the most fundamental aspects of thinking is the ability
to perceive similadties and differences among the events that we
expedence. Events rarely repeat themselves in exactly the same
way. And even if they did, it is still questionable whether Dur
interpretation would be quite the same as before. In this respect,
impressions are always new to us. It is Dur conceptual system,
however, that allows us to perceive similadties between new and old
expedences. We are inclined to relate incoming information to
things that we know. One mental operation by which this can be
accomplished is categodzation. By categodzing, the continuous
vadation in environmental information is reduced to manageable
and knowable proportions. Categodzation provides a means of
attaining cognitive economy (Rosch, 1978). In this way, adequate
reactions are possible.
Mental categories generallyare formed by experience.
Expedence, however, usually encompasses only a reduced sample of
the total set of exemplars of a category, and this raises a number of
important questions. The main issue, of course, is the question of
what these mental categodes are like. What is the nature of the
process of categodzation? Are there general constraints regarding
this process? How can limited expedence lead to knowledge of the
whole category? What are the constraints on this knowiedge? And
how, for instance, do we determine the boundades of a category?
How is expedence related to category width? A vadety of answers
353
Biases 
in categorization
have been given to these and related questions on how we farm a
mental representation of a category on the basis of Dur experience.
A short description of the historical development of views on
categorization and the main current theoretical positions Will be
dealt With first. From thai, it follows thai categorization is biased in
a number of different ways. We shall go into ibis matter
subsequently. With respect to biases, in succession, the role of
prototypes, basic level categories, existing schemata, the formation
of category boundaries and the influence of context, the
representation of feature frequency and correlation among features
Will be discussed, as weIl as the issues of selective attention,
hypothesis testing and task demands.
2. 
THEORETICAL VIEWS ON CATEGORIZATION
2.1 mstorlcal development
The study of categorization emerged within the field of
psychological learning theory. A braad distinction can be made
between earlier "associationistic" stimulus-response (S-R) theories
and later hypothesis-testing theories. It was the post-1950's
tradition of cognitive psychology that led to a preference for active
hypothesis-testing modeIs. The behaviorist tradition prior to the
cognitive shift entailed a passive associationistic account of the
category learning process. Because of the hypothesis-testing
theories the historical development will be briefly described here.
Hypothesis testing directs attention to certain aspects of the
information encountered, and this can be assumed to have a biasing
influence on the acquisition of categories. Besides, in hypothesis
testing people mayadopt various strategies, and show biases in this
respect toa.
As for the S-R account, it was HuIl (1920) who advanced the
"common element" view of category concepts. In his theory,
category learning involves the formation of an association between a
certain response and an element common to a class of different
stimuli. The category learner is viewed as passively undergoing a
series of experiences which gradually bring about these associations,
by reinforcement. HuIl's opinions were formed in the behavioristic
climate of his time. In this tradition the unobservable internal
processes of the organism were ignored and considered as a subject
unsuitable for scientific enterprise. Throughout the 1950's, the
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passive and mechanical associationistic account of the category
leaming process prevailed. S-R theories, however, appeared to be
too simplistic to account for central or thought processes that may
influence the category learner's response to the information
presented in the stimulus.
In about 1955, the S-R concept was to replaced by the input-
output concept. It was recognized that a complex program
controlled the input-output sequence (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram,
1960), and this opened the way for new approaches to the study of
cognitive processes, leading to the discovery of some sources of bias
in categorization. A theory was proposed according to which the
organism is seen as actively seeking information. According to this
view, categories are learned via an active, strategic process of
forming and testing hypotheses. Bruner, Goodnow and Austin
(1956) advanced this view. They provided an analysis of the nature
of categorization and its central role in cognition. They tried to
externalize the thought processes of people when learning to
categorize. They broke with the behavioristic tradition by verifying
the existence of hypothesis testing behavior. From the observed
behavior of the subjects they inferred certain pattems of purposive
behavior which they called strategies. The notion of strategies
enabled them to describe what the subject does "intemally" when
learning new classifications.
The work of Bruner et aL brought about fundamental changes
in category leaming theory, and stimulated an intensive analysis of
the variables affecting and the processes underlying category
leaming. The process by which subjects leam a category was
accepted to be one of forming hypotheses, which are tested and
revised in the light of information from experience. It was realized
that categories generallyare learned by examples. People of ten have
no controlover which instances are presented to them. Exemplars
and non-exemplars are pointed out to them as they happen to occur.
In that case, a logical way to leam the category is by following a kind
of reception strategy. This involves adopting a hypothesis, based on
either the whole or a part of the first category example, and
knowing how and when to alter it whenever new information is
presented. To study the strategies actually adopted by subjects,
Bruner designed a task that bas since been used as a standard
procedure. Visual stimuli were constructed that subjects had to
learn to classify into categories. Categories were defined by the
experimenter. For example, the subject was shown a series of
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geometric figures that differed along the following dimensions: farm
(the values being circle and square), colour (red and blue) and size
(small and large). A category could then be defined by all red
circles, for instance, leaving size as an irrelevant dimension. The
subject was asked to categorize each figure presented. In a
reception paradigm, the experimenter determined which stimulus
was shown, whereas in aselection paradigm the subjects were to
choose the next figure themselves. Following each categorization
the subject was told whether or not the response was correct.
Learning taak place from this feedback information. It was inferred
that the subject had identified the category when no more
categorization errors were made. Learning trials continued until the
subject c.onsistently responded correctly.
Bmner et al. showed that in this task there is a bias regarding
strategies of category learning. People do not behave randomly, but
appear to prefer certain actions above others in a systematical way.
Most people choose one of two strategies in formulating hypotheses
and selecting subsequent stimuli for testing as far as aselection
paradigm is concerned. A sizable number of subjects adopt a
wholistic or focusing strategy. That is, they formulate agiobal,
composite hypothesis based on the first category member they
encounter, and use this hypothesized mIe in making subsequent
responses until they encounter an instance that refutes the mIe.
Another strategy, adopted less frequently, is to formulate
hypotheses involving only a limited number of features of the first
example presented, rather than all of them. Such a strategy is
called scanning. The farmer strategy seems to be the optimal one
in this type of task, because the demands it makes on the subject's
memory are not as high as the latter. In general, people show a
preference for the strategy that requires the least memory laad, that
is, focusing. Nonetheless, the scanning strategy was also found to be
used in Bruner's experiments. With the paradigm mentioned above,
other issues were investigated toa. The influence of stimulus factors
like the number of relevant and/or irrelevant dimensions, the
number of values on the dimensions, and the type and complexity of
the rule defining the category, was studied, as were procedural
factors such as the order of presentation of the stimuli and the
amount and nature of feedback to the subject. The investigations
also dealt with the way in which hypotheses are revised on the basis
of feedback.
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Many of these variables and their combinations have been
shown to affect categorization learning (Bourne, Dominowski, &
Loftus, 1979). Categories defined by different mIes relating the
relevant features appeared to vary in difficulty. Also, it generally
appeared that subjects enter a category learning problem with a bias
favouring conjunctive (e.g. red and circle) over disjunctive (red
and/ or circle) mIes. Subjects more frequently state conjunctive
rather than disjunctive categorization mIes when bath are possible
(Runt & Hovland, 1960), and irrespective whether a conjunctive or
a disjunctive mIe applies, they tend to start testing conjunctive ones
(De Swart & Das-Smaal, 1976). However, as we shall see with many
factors in categorization, mIe difficulty is not quite independent of
the particular stimulus context in which it occurs. Pairs of features
mayor may not go together naturally, and ibis influences the ease
with which either conjunctions or disjunctions are formed
(Dominowski & Wetherick, 1976: Reznick & Richman, 1976).
Regarding the search for category mIes, Martin and Caramazza
(1980) in a more recent experiment presented evidence that
subjects develop rule systems also when leaming less well-defined
categories. In their experiment, there was no simple set of features
that could be used to determine membership of all exemplars of the
category. In that case, subjects appeared to look for mIes that
would enable them to categorize the stimuli as easily as possible.
Because the categories were structured so that no simple mIe could
serve to categorize the stimuli, subjects were forced to develop
complex sets of mIes if indeed they preferred to develop mIes.
Martin and Caramazza showed that this was what they actually did,
even in a complex situation. We shall retum to mIe development
and hypothesis testing as a source of bias later, in connection with
selective attention.
The studies mentioned above showed the existence of bias
regarding strategies of category learning and the search for
categorization mIes. The question of the nature of the information
that is stored in memory when a category is learned did not receive
much attention in the earlier studies. It was taken for granted that
categories simply consist of "defining" values and that categorization
is based on mIes for combining these values. The emphasis was
placed on the leaming process rather than on structure. In about
the last fifteen years, the trend of research on categorization
changed towards focusing on the issue of what is stored in memory,
thereby questioning the idea of defining value representation. The
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shift went together with more interest in natural, real-life
categories.
2.2 Conceptions of categories
According to what was to be called the "classical" conception
of categories mentioned above, it was assumed that all members of a
category share one or more defining features. If there is more than
one common feature, then a certain relationship among the features
is specified in the definition. Thus, in this view, each category bas
its own definition that provides necessary and sufficient conditions
for assigning category membership. Features that are not included
in the definition are irrelevant to category membership. By
experience we learn which features are the alles that define the
category, and by what rule they are connected. Following learning,
the categorization decision about new items is based exclusively on
whether or not an item fulfills the conditions in the definition, and
this is an all-or-none matter. This way, the category boundaries are
determinate and well-defined. Also in this view, any one exemplar
of the category should be as representative of the category as any
other. An example of a well-defined category is the category of
triangles, or sisters-in-Iaw, or odd numbers.
However, not all categories are that strictly definable. Many
categories may not conform to the classical view. It appears, for
instance, that in all kind of tasks non-defming features of a category
can also play an important role (e.g. Rosch, 1975; Das-Smaal & De
Swart, 1984, 1986). Non-defining features may contribute to
differences in typicality among category exemplars. An example is
the category of fruit. An apple is, at least to a Westerner, a beller
example of the category of fruit than a mango. Furthermore, the
category boundaries are not always quite clear. Not everyone is
certain about whether a tomato, a coconut or an olive should be
counted as a fruit. The boundaries between categories like fruit and
vegetables are vague. Vague boundaries and typicality differences
are not in keeping with the classical view of categOries. This bas led
many investigators to alternative views, mainly prototype alles. In
the prototype approach, the representation of a category is also
taken to be the result of an abstraction process, and it is generally
assumed that different category exemplars are integrated into one
memory structure, i.e. a summary representation of the category.
However, in contrast to the traditional view, it is thought that
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category representation is not restricted to a set of defining
features. For a feature to be included in the summary, it need only
be characteristic of the category.
It was Rosch's work (1973, 1975) that applied prototype
theory to natural categories, the implicit concepts of daily life.
Rosch and her co-workers have demonstrated the existence of
prototype effects in these categories. They showed that natural
categories have a graded structure in that same members are usually
regarded as prototypes or typical exemplars, whereas others are
considered less typical of the category. More specifically, Rosch
hypothesized that typicality of a category member is determined by
its family resemblance to other members of the same category. A
high farnily resemblance means that a large number of features are
shared with the other members, while at the same time few features
are shared with contrasting categories. Thus, the best exemplars of
one category will not be good representatives of other comparabIe
categories.
Typicality effects not only occur in natural categories like fruit
and vegetables, but also in ad hoc constructed and goal-derived
categories (Barsalou, 1983, 1985). In addition, typicality effects are
also reported to occur in well-defined categories. Das-Smaal & De
Swart (1981) were able to show this for a number of different tasks.
Categories that were constructed according to the traditional view --
with membership being sufficiently specified lust by defining
features --were nevertheless learned in a way that favoured typical
members over less typical alles. Bourne (1982), Armstrong.
Gleitman, & Gleitman (1983) and Vandierendonck (1989) also
demonstrated typicality effects in classically defined categories like
for instance odd numbers. A view according to which no aspect of
within-category variation is represented does not account for these
effects. A prototype position offers a better explanation of the
results.
There are a number of different interpretations of prototype
effects. A fairly common view, following the work of Rosch (1973,
1975), is that a prototype is an abstraction, an integration of
exemplars in same kind of memory structure. Category
membership can be gradual, and degree of membership of an
exemplar is determined by its similarity to the prototype. Later,
Rosch (1978) hers elf became somewhat reserved on the issue of
prototypes as a theory. Her position by 1978 was that prototype
effects do indicate that prototypes, or best examples, must have
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same place in psychological theories of representation, processing,
and leaming, but that they do not in themselves constitute any
particular representation or process model. This point is stressed
by Lakoff (1986). Lakoff, however, goes further and states that
although he acknowledges that prototype effe cts are real and that
even classically defined categories may give rise to prototype effects,
such effe cts are fiere shadows of cognitive modeIs. They show
nothing direct about the nature of categorization. Prototype effects
are a result of the fact that knowledge is organized in terms of
cognitive modeIs. Cognitive roDdels are used to structure and make
sense out of Dur experience. There are various kinds of cognitive
modeIs, and hence prototype effe cts may co me from different
sources. Although direct correlations between conceptual structure
and prototype effe cts do exist, in other cases the effects may arise
indirectly. They do not necessarily correspond to degrees of
membership of exemplars. A full study of category structure
therefore must provide an account of the details of the cognitive
roDdels that give rise to the effects.
Other "post-Roschian" theoretical propos als also stress the
importance of theories or mental roDdels in categorization. In
general, it can be stated that sin ce Rosch's original publications, the
theoretical thinking about categorization bas been moving away from
an emphasis on objective features and similarity to an insistence on
the role of cognitive roDdels in categorization behavior. The
influence of cognitive roDdels provides an obvious source of bias,
which will be discussed later in the sections on prototypes and
schemas. Suffice it to say here that theoretical development will
undoubtedly lead to a richer view of intra- and inter-concept
relationships thanthat advanced so far (e.g. Medin & Wattenmaker,
1987; Neisser, 1987).
Besides the classical and prototype approaches, a third
conception of categories is the exemplar view. According to this
idea, categories are represented by the collection of individual
exemplars someone knows. In this case there is no abstracted
representation of a category. Rather, categorical knowledge
consists of an extensional description of the set of experienced
exemplars. Categorization of an unknown exemplar is determined
by the degree to which it is similar to an already experienced
exemplar. The weaknesses of the exemplar view were outIined by
Das-Smaal (1986). One argument against exemplar representation
is for instance the fact that specific exemplars are of ten poorly
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remembered (e.g. Bourne & O'Banion. 1969). The exemplar view
also encounters problems in representing generalized knowledge
that pertains to exemplar features. such as knowledge on conjoint
frequencies or relevancy of features to the categorization decision.
As for the latter aspect. Das-Smaal & De Swart (1981) showed in a
set of experiments that the degree of representativeness of features
to their "central" value (e.g. the similarity of the shape of a flower
leaf to the most typical farm for that flower) influenced category
learning. but that this effect was restricted to features that were
relevant to the categorization decision. Relevancy was determined
by frequency of occurrence in one category relative to occurrence in
other categories. The discrepancy in effe cts of relevant versus
irrelevant features was thought to be explained best by an
interaction of selective attention. guided by expectations. and the
knowledge that is built up (Das-Smaal. 1986; Das-Smaal et al..
1987). In the course of learning. the information that has been
gathered is used to direct attention to features deemed relevant.
Features considered irrelevant to category abstraction may be
represented incompletely or may not be remembered at allo
Without abstraction of relevant features this phenomenon is hard to
explain. In facto it is not clear what constitutes a category at all
when only exemplars are represented. as Smith and Medin (1981)
pointed out. Also. there is a problem about what is dolle when only
summary information is given and no exemplars are experienced.
Categories may be learned by being stated rather than via examples.
Same kind of abstraction seems to be required. although it may
certainly be the case that same individual exemplars are also
remembered and used in subsequent categorical judgments (see for
instance Brooks. 1987).
Perhaps an exemplar view combined with a new approach to
memory processes can overcome the objections mentioned above.
Recently. Hintzman (1986) put forward such a theoretical approach.
Although he does not preclude the existence of abstract memory
representations. Hintzman maintains that they have no special
status or function. ft is assumed that each specific event to which
one attends. is encoded as a new episodic memory trace. The
theory differs from other approaches to memory in that information
is abstracted from concrete experiences at the time of retrieval
rather than during learning. A new experience gives rise to a
process of activating or reminding of other similar experiences. and
it is the summed contribution of these activated traces that is used
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to categorize the new experience, by analogy. The point is that
abstraction does occur, but only momentarily, as a result of
activation by a new experience. It need not be built up during
learning, and stored explicitly in memory.
A variant of this view was put forth by Das-Smaal (1986,
pp. 121-123) to account for the effects of context and of the flexible
use of categories found in her experiments. A distinctlon was
suggested between the information that is stored to represent a
category, and procedures for using that information. Categories dö
not exist in memory in a ready-made format. It was contended that
in order to be able 10 account for a number of phenömena regarding
categorization behavior. the constituent parts of the category
information should be separately available in memory. During
learning, it appears that attention, guided by Dur schemas or
theories and expectancies, does play an important role in
determining which aspects will be represented and which ones will
not. Next, computational mechanisms make use of the information
in a flexible way, as needed, dependent on task requirements or the
utilization goal. For instance, a certain feature can be highlighted in
a metaphor or primed by advance activation of a category to which it
is related. Whenever a category member is experienced, it gives
rise to a momentary activation pattern, which in turn results, in
same specified way, in the activation of categories. Once a category
is learned, excitatory and inhibitory relations among correlated
features and contrasting categories. respectively.. are assumed to
contribute to the resulting activation pattern. Furthermore, due to
contextual factors certain features may be temporarily more
important than others. That is, these features receive same extra
activation, while others may become simultaneously inhibited.
Contextual factors are used in a braad sense here, and may also
imply the "intemai" context of features activated by thought or
experience. Regarding context, it was Barsalou (1982) who made
the distinction between context-independent and context-
dependent information in categories. Context~independence arises
automatically from a high frequency of occurrence of features in a
category as experienced by a person. Context-independent
information is activated on all occasions. Context-dependent
information, on the öther hand, refers to properties thai are
activated only in certain contexts. In hls more recent work..
Barsalou (1985, 1987) also stresses thai representations should not
be viewed as invariant structures, but as dynamic alles thai vary
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across contexts. Whenever a category is used. it is constructed in
working memory from knowledge in long-term memory. Context-
independent information may automatically be part of it. What other
information is used depends on the situation. We shall return to the
biasing influence of context later in this chapter.
2.3 Contrasts and combinations
The theoretlcal views described above were only summarily
dealt with here. Many variants have been proposed. Prototype
models may differ in what is assumed to be abstracted. This is an
important issue regarding biases. What exactly do we leam from
experience with a category's members and nonmembers? One
could assume, for instance, that feature experience frequencies are
abstracted (e.g. Neumann, 1974), or distances among exemplars
(Posner & Keele, 1970), or an integrated pattern of propositlons
plus an allowable set of transformatlons (Bransford & Franks, 1971).
Among feature frequency models a further distlnctlon is possible
between representation of simply independent features and their
frequencies (Kellogg, 1981), and representatlon of bath simple and
conjoint frequencies of features (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977).
In additlon, combinatlons of the views have been proposed, for
example, in Medin & Schaffer's context-theory (1978) in which
bath exemplar-representatlon and a more abstract representatlon
are hypothesized. Frequency- and prototype-distance models
appear not to be mutually exclusive (Das-Smaal & De Swart 1984,
1986). A contlnuous variabie dimensional value like the color red
may show up within a category (e.g. apples) in several different
variants. These variants of the value red differ in the degree to
which they are typical of the category. However, there are also
differences regarding the relatlve frequency with which the value
red occurs within the category. The frequency variabie has lts own
clear and specific effects on category leaming and lts results,
independent of the effect of variant typicality. In short, frequency-
and prototype-distance models that account for effects of frequency
and variant typicality, respectlvely, may be complementary to one
another. A frequency model that assumes contlnuous dimensions
divided into intervals, and as with discrete values, representatlons
of frequencies of these intervals, accounts for bath effects
mentloned (Das-Smaal & De Swart, 1986). Moreover, such a model
unites the classic al and the prototype approaches in the sense that
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the same principles of categorizing underlie bath "classical"
categories, with defming features, and categories with features that
occur of ten but not necessarily always among category members.
"Definingness" in a strict sense should then be replaced by same
related but less rigid measure of variability, such as the degree to
which a feature is representative of a category. This avoids the
problem of whether or not people are able to specify defining
features or whether or not they ultimately have defining features
represented. At the same time it has the advantage of accounting
for same cases of differences among category members as to how
good an example they are. The problem that then remains is just
what it is that determines variation in representativeness or
typicality. Differences in typicality have been found in a wide range
of category types, and it appears to be a very important variabie in
relation to all kinds of tasks having to do with categories. It is
therefore important to understand the constraints related to these
phenomena. We shall turn to this subject now. In the neKt sections
we take up same basic issues in preferential ways of learning and
using categories.
. 
BIASES IN CATEGORIZATION
3.1 Prototypes
From the preceding discus sion it can be concluded that the
work of Rosch and her associates bas suggested very interestlng
issues that are relevant to preferentlal biases in categorizatlon.
Although it should be kept in mind that many other factors are
involved in learning and determining category membership. one
very important factor bas been described in the literature as the
usage of prototypes. It bas been argued that many categories are
represented by prototypes. with exemplars varying in their
similarity to the prototype. The implicatlon is that people do not
act equally toward a1l members of a category. A chair is a beller
example of fumiture than a lamp or a piano. People are much faster
at determining category membership for typical members than they
are for atypical members. Also. when thinking about a category.
typical members come to mind with a higher probability than less
typical ones. Prototypes may furthermore serve as reference points
in similarity judgments (Rosch. 1975). We tend to select the
prototype as a referent. and the other item as a subject. The
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reference point is the stimulus which other stimuli are geen "in
relation to". For instance. we gay that a panther resembles a cat
rather than that a cat resembles a panther. Tversky and Kahneman
(1983) showed how the use of such reference points can lead to
biases in reasoning. People employ typical cases as the basis for
their judgments. and inferences are made from typical to non-
typical members. Also the results of comparisons between items
appear not to be invariant with respect to the directionality of the
comparison. Thus. the choice of a reference point may influence
one's judgment. The issue of biases in reasoning is discussed
extensively elsewhere in this hook.
What sorts of biases are further implied by prototype theory?
Following her observation that natural categories are organized
around a prototype. two general and basic principles for the
formation of categories were given by Rosch (1978). The first is a
functlonal one and asserts that people are biased to develop category
systems that provide maximum information with the least effort.
The second regards the structure of the informatlon thus provided.
and implies that the perceived world comes to us as structured
informatlon rather than as arbitrary. or unpredictable features.
The first principle states that categorizing is aimed at what
Rosch calls "cognitlve economy". This means on the one hand that
categories should preserve informatlon about the environment as
much as possible. but on the other hand --to minimize cognitive
laad --that they should reduce the infinite differences allang
stimuli to manageable proportlons. In other words. the aim is to
maximize the informatlon accounted for. and to keep at a minimum
the number of categories that have to be distinguished. Economy
also implies a maximizatlon of intercategorical differences. so that
the categories wiIl be as distlnctlve as possible.
In this context. the conceptlon of hierarchical organizatlon of
categories is of relevance. Rosch claims that natural categories are
hierarchically related. Larger categories usually contain a number of
smaller ones. Three levels are distinguished. Superordinate
categories. such as clothing. contain basic-level categories (e.g.
trousers). which in turn contain subordinate categories (e.g. Levi's).
Cognitlve economy is maximized at the basic level. The basic level is
the level at which the objects share the most features with the other
members of the category. At lower levels. the features of members
of a particular category most frequently overlap with features of
members of other categories. That is. most of them are distlnctlve.
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whereas at superordinate levels there is less total similarity within a
given category because there are relatively few features common to
all members. Basic levels categories like car, table, or bird are the
alles that languages tend to denote by single nouns, the alles that
children learn fIrst, and the alles we use most of ten in talking about
the objects around us.
Rosch maintains that her claims conceming a basic level of
abstraction can be formalized in terms of cue validity (e.g. Beach,
1964). Cue validity is a probabilistic concept indicating the
predictive validity of a feature of a category.. and is based on the
frequency of occurrence of features in bath the focal category and
other categories. A category exemplar with a high total cue validity
is differeritïated more from other categories than one of lower total
cue validity. Cue validity is maximized at the basic level.
Besides the first principle of categorization, cognitive
economy, another principle was mentioned by Rosch. This second
principle asserts that. the environment is perceived as possessing a
correlational structure. The combinations of what we perceive as
features are not equiprobable. Rather, same features co-occur more
than others. Rosch argues that we tend to farm categories that
mirror the structure perceived in the environment, although she
recognizes in her later work that it mayalso be crue that this
structure is something that is imposed on regularities in nature by
Dur conceptualizing minds (Rosch, 1978). Evidence that people
indeed are sensitive to cue validity and correlated features will be
presented separately in later sections.
In the description of Rosch's basic principles of
categorization. it was assumed that category representations can be
decomposed into features. However, it should be mentioned that in
the literature there is uncertainty as to exactly what features are.
Features can be concrete or abstract, and they may be categories
themselves toa. Their perception may be the re sult of a built-in
constraint of our perceptual system, or they may count as a feature
due to theory-related constraints. That. is, Dur theories determine
them as relevant because of convenience to Dur way of thinking
about the world (Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987). We will not. go
further into the question of what these features are. This. however,
is an important issue that requires further clarification.
Application of the prototype approach has not been limited to
object categories. Research has extended it to different domains,
where it serves as a useful organizational framework. Psychological
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constructs like intelligence (Neisser. 1979) and emotion (Fehr &
Russeli. 1984) show a graded structure. as do categories of
personality traits (Buss & Craik. 1983; Smid & Zwinderman. 1986)
and categories of social perception (Cantor. Mischel. & Schwartz,
1982; Cohen. 1983). In applying prototypes to personality
research. various traits. features. behaviors. or situations are
distinguished according to the degree of typicality relative to a
concept from this domain. It appears. for instance. that people
consider excitement as a more typical feature of emotion than
boredom. In this way. researchers try to put order in the contents
of these constructs. which are of ten vague. In addition. the results
are used to design questionnaires (e.g. Broughton. 1984; De Jong.
1988; Visser & Das-Smaal. in preparation). Here the prototype idea
has also been shown to be a fruitful approach. The biases mentioned
in the beginning of this paragraph concerning the non-equivalence
of different category members are put into practice in these
domains.
To summarize. two important categorization principles
mentioned by Rosch serve to bias or constrain the categories that
we farm. These are striving for cognitive economy. which is
maximized at the basic level. and sensitivity to correlated features.
The implication of the principles of categorization is that to
increase distinctiveness among categories. categories tend to be
formed around prototypes. Prototypes represent the features that
are not only the most representative of the category members, but
also the least representative of nonmembers. People do not
consider all category members as equivalent. but are biased to focus
on prototypes in a number of cognitive activities.
3.2 Schemas and levels of cognitive functionlng
A kind of bias stemming from prototypes that bas not been
mentioned is the development of specific expectations resulting
from the activation of a prototype. In this respect. the term schema
is of ten used. The use of a schema framework bas become
widespread in psychological research. At the same time interest is
now growing in complex. composite categories (Millward. 1980;
MandIer. 1984; Medin & Smith. 1984). Research on categorization
bas been dominated by the use of simple categories. However. these
categories can be further integrated and related to each other to
farm more complex organizations of knowIedge. Such elaborated.
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interconnected knowledge structures are most generally referred to
as schemas. although the schema notion implies also an active
organizing principle. Not just categories can be coded by schemas.Events. 
stories and scenes can also be represented by schematic
farms of organization. Prototypes can be considered as a sart of
schema. To a certain extent same variation in the objects that
rnight fit a particular schema is allowed. and constraints as to what
the typical features are also exist. Schemas in general can be
conceived of as conceptually organized clusters of knowIedge. They
lead to expectancies that guide bath the comprehension of what we
perceive. and the planning and execution of our actions. People can
instantiate schemas in the absence of external evidence. and these
instantiations are referred to as their default values (see for instance
MandIer. 1984). In making category judgments. people of ten rely
on prototypical schemas.
Social stereotypes can be considered to function in an
analogous way. Social stereotypes are frequently used to stand for a
category as a whole. for instance people of a certain race. As such.
they may lead one to jump to conclusions about individual members
of that category. This may be viewed as the application of features to
the entire category that actually apply only to the stereotype. In
terms of schema activation it can be stated that only partial evidence
can activate a whole stereotype schema. This also implies the
activation of features that are not part of the current evidence. by
default.
Likewise. schemas in general are used to gulde the
interpretation of what we perceive. It is a comrnonplace observation
that people tend to perceive what they expect to perceive. In this
way. knowledge puts important constraints on perception and
categorization. The idea that stimulus analysis is guided by
expectations is central to schema theories (Neisser. 1967). Current
experiences are assimilated with past experiences. and what we
subsequently perceive is influenced by these experiences. Thus.
perception contains the memory of earlier encounters. as Arnold
(1984) put it. As aresult. the accounts of stimuli may be different
from the stimuli that evoked them. Das-Smaal's (1986) fmdings on
the effects of typicality-range experience. which will be described in
the next paragraph on category boundaries. serve to illustrate this
point. In a category learning experiment. two groups of subjects
differed in the range of typicality over which the features of the
stimuli were varied during learning. The groups subsequently
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appeared to respond in different ways to the same inter-stimulus
distance. The "psychological" distance between the stimuli from
two categories was larger when a small rather than braad range of
typical variants was experienced during learning. This shows that
prior experience can make a significant difference in typicality
judgments and in subjective intercategorical distance.
The observation that people use schemas to infer that certain
unobserved and unmentioned features must be present is an obvious
source of bias. It was Bartlett (1932) who applied the concept of
schema to the domain of memory, in particular in relation to text
comprehension. He pointed out that part of what we remember is
Dur understanding of what we have experienced. Perception and
memory should be viewed as constructive and reconstructive
activities, respectively. Bartlett showed that subjects recalling a
rather bizarre story exhibit systematic inaccuracies in memory.
They distort the story to fit their own stereotype schemas. It is
currently assumed that schemas are produced by an interaction
between what we experience in the actual world, and Dur
expectations driven by other activated schemas. Both factors can be
very personal, especially regarding the affective components.
Therefore, one might expect especially this source of bias to have a
personal aspect. However, in the case of socially determined
stereotypes, as no personal experience is implied and the
stereotype schema is typically shared by a group of persons, this
personal aspect by defmition pertains to certain groups of people.
Recently, much attention bas been paid to the importance of
the relationship between category representation and other levels of
cognitive functioning. For the higher levels, for instance, Murphy
and Medin (1985) and Medin and Wattenmaker (1987) emphasize
the influence of people's theories about the world on categorization.
This idea bas already been touched on earlier in this chapter. In
their opinion, categories should be viewed as embedded in
coherent, integrated knowledge systems, that in turn are based on
perception, memory, and imagination. Categories are coherent
insofar as they fit into someone's beliefs and knowIedge. Implicit
theories constrain our understanding of relationships bath within
and among categories to a high degree. That is not to gay that these
are the only constraints affecting categorization. Although
theoretical factors are believed to be important, other factors, like
the use of primarily perceptual information, play a role toa.
According to Murphy and Medin, feature modeIs. in principle, can
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encompass the important aspects of gene ral knowIedge. but this has
not been accomplished yet.
The schema notion has also been described in terms of
activation patterns in a parallel distributed processing approach
based on the brain metaphor (Norman. 1986). This approach has
recently be co me increasingly popular. Low-level processing
structures are assumed to re sult in higher order regularitles in the
following way. Information is represented by features. and each type
of feature is represented by same unit in memory. Each stimulus
attended to gives rise to a pattem of activation of units. and each
time. this changes the strength of the connections atnong
simultaneously occurring units. A unit may be involved in various
events. Therefore. memory is said to be distributed across feature
units. Units are functionally autonomous. but may show parallel
activity. Categories are coded in terms of patterns of connections
among units. A category has lts own specific pattern of activation
that mirrors the regularities of experience. Schemas or prototype
patterns develop if many similar activation p~tterns ~re
superimposed. This results in a composite trace that functions like
an abstraction. Schemas are not fixed. permanent cognitive
structures. but temporary patterns of activity. A similar pattem can
be reinstated at another time. However. each re-creation may differ
somewhat from the previous ones. The schema is constructed anew
for each occasion by combining past experiences with biases and
activation levels that result from the actual stimulus and context
(Norman. 1986). Therefore. in this approach. category tlexibility is
accounted for. since the context is part of the constellation of
activated units. This is an obvious advantage in view of the biasing
intluence of context. That is. categories may vary as the current
context varies. For future theoretical development. it is an
interesting idea that the assumption of distributed memory
representation is not necessarily at odds with models of
categorization (Knapp & Anderson. 1984; Oden. 1987)..
3.3 Category width and context
The description of categories in terms of prototypes with
same degree of allowable variation among members raises the
problem of defining category width. How much discrepancy is
allowable among members of a category? Can constraints 011
boundaries between categories arise as a result of leaming alone.
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and if so, how? What are our biases in this respect? This issue has
not received much attention. Same research has indicated that the
category width variabie experienced during learning does have an
impact on subsequent categorïzation. It is also true that perceived
boundaries are context-dependent. Furthermore, as we shall see,
category ranges themselves can have a biasing influence on
similarity judgments among items.
Although categories are formed in bounded representations,
boundaries are not always clear. It was Rosch (e.g. 1975) who
stressed this aspect of natural categories. On the other hand, in the
prototype approach, the question of the ultimate range of
discrepancies among category exemplars that a person is willing to
accept was left open. Differences in degree of membership among
exemplars was the main point dealt with in this approach. However,
it is obvious that people may differ as to the ranges of their concepts
of few, several, many, or a lot, for example. What are the minima,
and what the maxima of each of these concepts? Context may be of
relevance here. People do not always have to react to an object or an
event simply in ways typical of same category to which the object or
event belongs. People also have to respond to new aspects of the
tota! situation at hand. They must be able to adapt their behavior to
specific cïrcumstances. Context may provide a clue as to how the
category should be apprehended in a particular situation. Context
may cause certain features to be temporarily considered as more
important than they would otherwise he.
A study by Labov (1973) provides an illustration of fuzzy
boundaries and contextual influence. Labov studied the boundary
between the cup and bowl categories. He was interested in which
items subjects would call cups, and which ones they would call
bowls, when given a series of items. The items increased in their
ratio of width to depth. Subjects were asked to classify pictures of
these objects. With increasing relative width, there was a gradual
shift in responses from cup to bowl, but there was no clear-cut point
where subjects stopped using cup. Even more interestlng was that
when subjects were asked to imagine the object placed on a table
and filled with food, more bowl responses were given, although the
same gradual shift appeared from cup to bowl. Thus, boundaries not
only can be unclear, but they can also be influenced by the context
in which something is placed. This shows that boundaries are
flexible. Regarding individual variation in boundaries, McCloskey
and Glucksberg (1978) showed that boundaries for categories like
371Biases 
in categorization
fruit or disease vary among people. It even appeared that people
themselves are not stabie in their opinion. Many subjects changed
their rnind about the categorization of same atypical members when
tested one month later.
Although there seems to be same instability about category
width bath among and within people, a number of researchers have
shown in a variety of tasks that, broadly, people can be qualified as
either relatively narrow, or relatively wide categorizers. That is,
same people consistently categorize atypical items in the same
category, whereas others consistently categorize these same items
in different categories (Detweiler, 1978). According to Detweiler,
these individual differences are the result of developmental,
cultural, and experiential factors. Detweiler also suggests same
effects of category width as an individual difference variabie of
behavior. For instance, narrow categorizers show beller face recall,
adjust less weIl to different cultures, are more ethnocentric, and
make different atiributions to foreigners than to non-foreigners
(Detweiler, 1975, 1978).
Regarding biases, it is important to note that differences in
category width may yield different categorizations of a particular
object or event. Thus, the same stimulus may be interpreted
differently by different persons. The foregoing remarks on context
and individu al differences concerned boundaries once they are
formed. Das-Smaal and De Swart (1984, 1986) addressed the
question of boundary formatlon. Their alm was not to ascertain
individual differences due to styles of categorizatlon. Rather, the
possible influence of experience on category width was investlgated.
The results not only showed how category ranges can be
determined by learning experience, but also how range experience
influences the perceived within-category variation in typicality. In
the learning phase, exemplars of a focal and a contrast category
were composed of either a small range of typical variants only, or a
braad range of bath typical and atypical exemplars. As predicted, in
contrast to narrow range experience, experience with a braad range
of variants resulted in a relatlvely large extension of the focal
category. It also resulted in beller categorization of navel atypical
focal category exemplars. This confirms Detweiler's idea that
experience may determine the subsequent way of categorizing.
Another effect shown in the studies by Das-Smaal and De Swart
concemed the judged distance between categories and subjectlve
typicality differences within categories. It appeared that small as
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compared with braad range experience had the effect of polarizing
the focal and the contrast category. Thus, the same physical
distance was judged differently, depending on range of experience.
This polarization effect counts as a source of bias in category
learning, caused by the category width experienced during learning.
In additlon, a recurrent fin ding in the experiments was the
compression of the focal category following braad range experience.
That is, members of the same category were feIt to look more alike
in this condition. To test whether this effect was indeed due to the
width of the category, and not to the greater number of variants, in
the later study a third range condition was added. This condition
implied braad range experience, but with a limited number of
differing variants. The results were essentlally the same as with a
braad range, indicating that the range was the crncial factor.
To summarize, the influence of the category range experience
factor can be characterized in the following way. Learning
experience with a braad rather that narrow range of variants results
in enhanced discriminability across a category boundary, and in
decreased discrimination within a category. A similar range bias has
been reported lately by Conner, Land and Booth (1987).
3.4 Feature frequency
In paragraph 3.1 on prototypes, it was stated that Rosch
suggested maximization of cue validity to be a determining factor
regarding the internal structure of a category. According to this
principle, the best examples of categories are those exemplars that
have the most in common with other members of the same
category, and share the least with contrasting categories. It is the
latter additlon that constitutes an important research issue. When
people leam a category, do they use informatlon on contrastlng
categories at all when forming the foca! category? And if so, then
what informatlon do they use, and what effect does it have on the
category to be leamed?
It is of ten assumed that in learning a category, the learner
keeps track of the frequencies with which features occur within
that category. Indeed, there is substantial evidence for
accumulation of frequency informatlon during category leaming (e.g.
Neumann, 1974; Goldman & Homa, 1977; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-
Roth, 1977; Chumbley et al., 1978; Kellogg et al., 1978). One could
argue, then, that in a category representation the features
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represented are the ones that occur most of ten among category
members. This is in fact what Neumann (1974) for instance
proposed in his attribute-frequency model. According to his model,
a category prototype is formed that contains the maximal number of
the most frequently experienced features.
Occurrence of features within one category certainly is of
relevance in the representation of that category. However, it could
also be the case that precisely the same things that distinguish one
category from other categories make up the most important
information. In this view, when a category is being leamed, the
leamer pays particular attention to those features that provide the
sharpest contrast with other related categories. These so-called
distinctive features may then become central to the category
representation. In that view, a category representation not only
contains information on occurrence in the focal category, but also on
occurrence in contrasting categories. The latter information can of
course only be leamed when contrasting categories are experienced
in addition to the category to be learned. In the latter view,
contrasting categories are useful in aleaming phase because they
provide information on the occurrence of features outside the focal
category. Distinctiveness from other categories is not always
accounted for in categorization modeis. It is however accounted for
in models that have cue validity as a critical term, such as the
property-set model proposed by Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1977).
As mentioned earlier, cue validity can be defined as the frequency
with which a cue, or a feature, occurs in one category, divided by
the total frequency of that cue across all categories. Cue validity
thus takes into account resemblance within a category, as weIl as
distinctiveness from contrasting categories.
In the category learning tasks of several experiments by Das-
Smaal and De Swart (1984, 1986), feature frequency was varied in
bath the focal and contrasting categories. As for occurrence in the
focal category, a high frequency of features was assumed to facilitate
categorization performance. In addition, the influence of
occurrence in a contrasting category was investigated exterisively on
the hypothesis that the frequency of the features in the contrasting
category would affect categorization performance and
representativeness ratings. Category exemplars were expected to
be categorized more easily and judged as more representative as the
frequency of their composing features in the contrasting category
was lower during leaming. This effect was studied bath by varying
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frequency in the contrasting category and by either including or not
including a contrast category in the learning task.
Frequency of occurrence of features in the focal category. as
compared to their occurrence in the contrasting category. was
expressed in terms of cue validity. The question was what do
subjects learn from this state of affairs about the representativeness
of a feature; i.e. to what degree is it used and relied upon in
subjective judgments following learning?
The influence of the frequency of feature occurrence among
contrasting category items on categorizing focal category exemplars
was a very robust fmding. coming from converging sources. It was
demonstrated repeatedly. employing a variety of learning paradigms,
testing methods. and dependent variables. In all experiments. high
tota! cue validity of exemplars facilitated learning and classification
follOwing learning. It also appeared that when leaming had to take
place from focal category exemplars only. without experiencing a
contrast category. categorization was guided by the focal frequency
of the features.
When features with the same cue validity but with different
frequencies of occurrence in the focal category were compared.
focal frequency showed its own influence. apart from cue validity.
Features of higher frequency were judged as more typical. However.
distinctive features --that is. features that occur frequently and
exclusively in the focal category --appeared to be the most typical
and most important alles to classification following learning.
Delaying testing proved that this was all the more true with the
passing of time.
The apparent conclusion from the findings is that people
collect considerable knowledge of the frequency with which
features occur in particular categories during learning. This
knowledge is not restricted to just the focal category. but also
extends to the contrast category. People are able to use this
knowledge in order to evaluate relative frequencies. that is.
occurrence in one category as compared with occurrence in a
contrast category.
3.5 Correlatlon among features
Another controversial issue regarding frequency of occurrence
is whether or not subjects learn about each feature in an
independent manner from the other features. The question is: Does
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frequency of co-occurrence of features affect category formation?
Furthermore, if people are sensitive to correlations among features,
does this mean thai all correlations are registered?
Rosch et al. (1978) have claimed thai the perceived world
comes as structured information rather than as arbitrary,
equiprobable co-occurring features. Features thai characterize the
members of natural categories are of ten correlated, and these
conjoint frequencies are mirrored in the categories thai people
farm. The suggestion thai conjoint frequency affects categorization
was also made by Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1977) and by Medin
and Schaffer (1978). Murphy and Medin (1985) also state thai
correlations are represented in mental categories, although they
need not always be based on empirical relations; they can also
mirror a person's ideas about the relationships.
The point of correlational structure has also been emphasized
by Anderson (1985). Anderson describes the structure of natural
categories as a schematic structure, and asserts thai schemas
represent (among other things) Dur knowledge about how
dimensional values tend to go together to define objects. Thus
according to Anderson, it is the interrelational structure, the
configuration of dimensional values, rather than just a list of values
thai defines a category.
On the other hand, Kellogg (1981) argues thai stimulus
features are independently represented, and thai only simple
frequencies are counted. Kellogg's study, a category learning
experiment, failed to produce conjoint frequency effects. In his
study, however, the features upon which conjoint frequency was
varied were all irrelevant to categorization. The possibility remains
thai conjoint frequency effects will show up when relevant features
are concerned. This question was tackled by Das-Smaal & De Swart
(1986). In thai study, it appeared indeed thai the effectiveness of
conjoint frequency shows up when at least one of the features is
important to categorization. Conjoint frequency increases the
judged typicality of an irrelevant feature when it correlates with a
feature thai is important to categorization. This explains why
Kellogg (1981) did not find any conjoint frequency effect using
features thai were all irrelevant to categorization. Moreover, this is
another indication of a source of bias in category learning.
The assumption thai effects of conjoint frequency are
constrained to situations in which at least one of the joint features is
relevant to or characteristic of the category also solves a major
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problem noted bath by Reed (1982) and by Medin and Smith (1984)
and Medin and Wattenmaker (1987). They argue that it is not
probable that all possible correlations among features are taken into
account. because they are toa numerous. The condition of relevancy
of at least one of the conjoint features may in this respect appear to
be a very important constraint on the correlations that are taken
into account.
Stated in terms of the view put forward by Das-Smaal (1986)
mentioned at the end of paragraph 2.2 in this chapter. the following
may apply. Excitatory relations between two irrelevant features do
nothing significant to increase the activation of the category.
However. when at least one relevant feature is concemed. the
increased activation of the category is the result. facilitating
categorization and increasing typicality judgments. The irrelevant
feature activates the category by way of lts relationship to the highly
characteristic feature.
Another interesting potential explanation bears on the Gestalt
claim that "the whole is more than the sum of the parts". It may be
speculated that the formation of interrelations by conjoint
frequency. and the resulting additional activation through mutual
excitation. gives rise to same of these effects. The results of the
present study indicate that correlation of features enhances the
typicality of the "whole" stimulus containing the correlated features.
relative to non-redundant combination. This shows that the
conjoint occurrence of values during learning can cause the whole to
be perceived as more than the sum of lts parts. The existence of a
predominant manner of organizing the parts of a stimulus may. in a
comparabIe way. be due to special interrelations between features in
memory. whether they are learned or physiologically "pre-wired".
The effects of leaming the interrelations have been established in
the study by Das-Smaal and De Swart (1986).
3.6 Selective attention
From the study conducted by Das-Smaal and De Swart (1986)
mentloned above. it appeared that typicality of an irrelevant feature
increases only if this feature correlates with a feature that is
important to categorization. This could explain why Kellogg (1981)
found no effect of correlations. because in hls experiment the
features between which the correlations were varied were bath
irrelevant to the categorizatlon decision. Results from other
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experiments by Das-Smaal and De Swart (1981) indicate that with a
well-defined category like the one Kellogg used. attention is
directed at relevant features. not at irrelevant alles. or If so to a
lesser degree. Typicality effects were restricted to features that
were relevant to the categorizatlon decision. It should be noted
here that typicality and relevance in these experiments were not
the same thing. Typicality. as it was conceived of in these
experiments. had to do with the range of a feature. whereas
relevance had to do with its probability of occurrence. Features may
vary in their frequency of occurrence. and this affects categorizatlon
as discussed previously. However. contlnuous features may also vary
in the typicality of the variants with which they occur. For instance,
the feature red may occur with a certain range of variants of this
color. and these variants are not equally typical of red. It appeared
that category learning was facilitated by high rather than low typical
feature variants when relevant features were concerned. No such
difference was found with irrelevant features. The discrepancy may
be explained by the existence of an interactlon between the
selectlvity of attentlon and the knowledge that is built up (e.g. Das-
Smaal et al.. 1987). In the beginning of category learning. there is
no category informatlon available in memory to direct attentlon to
specific features. The analysis of the stimulus is data driven.
probably influenced by the salience of features. However. in the
course of learning. the analysis becomes more "top down". guided by
hypotheses or expectatlons. The informatlon that bas been
gathered is used 10 direct attentlon to features deemed relevant. the
latter being guided. e.g. by frequency. Finally. the learner will end
up with detailed representatlons of informatlon on at least the
focused features. The informatlon that is stored includes various
details about frequencies as weIl as informatlon on their typicality
ranges. as bas been shown in studies by Das-Smaal and De Swart
(1984. 1986). Features considered irrelevant to category
abstraction may be represented incompletely or may not be
remembered at allo This is what a recognitlon experiment by
Nickerson and Adams (1979) indicated. These authors showed that
whereas knowledge of color and size of a U.S. penny is good,
knowledge of its visual details is poor. Features such as color and
size are relevant to the distlnctlon between a penny and other corns.
Additlonal details. on the other hand. are irrelevant to the purposes
for which pennies are employed. Hence they appárently do not
receive much attentlon.
E. 
Das-Smaal378
3.7 Hypothesis testing
In the foregoing, selective attention was mentioned as a
source of bias. Expectations or hypotheses contribute to directing
attentlon to what is deemed relevant. Since this places a constraint
on the kind of information that is gathered regarding a category, it
specifies the bias of selectlve attentlon.
The idea of hypothesis testlng when learning categories was
studied in experiments following the work by Bruner described
earlier. The investigations dealt with the kind of hypotheses
subjects entertained during learning and how these hypotheses
were revised on the basis of feedback. A number of models have
been developed regarding the way in which a subject might choose
among a pool of hypotheses. Early models (Restle, 1962; Bower &
Trabasso, 1964) assumed that the subject begins a learning task
with a universe of hypotheses from which he draws one. This
hypothesis dictates hls response. The subject retains the
hypothesis if hls response turns out to be correct, but discards it
and selects another one if hls response is wrong. A refuted
hypothesis is supposed to be returned to the pool. Later
experiments refuted the assumption of no memory for previously
tested hypotheses (e.g. Levine, 1966).
A more elaborate vers ion of hypothesis-testlng theory was
formulated by Levine (1969). This theory assumes that the subject
begins a learning task by sampling a subject from the universe of
hypotheses. He or she then takes one hypothesis from the subset as
the working hypothesis upon which hls or her response is based.
The working hypothesis is retained if the response is correct. If the
response is wrong, the working hypothesis is discarded, and a new
working hypothesis is chosen from the subset. If the subset is
empty, the subject takes a new subset of several hypotheses and
chooses a new working hypothesis from this subset. Other
hypotheses from the subset are updated simultaneously af ter each
feedback. These hypotheses are eliminated from the subset when
they turn out to be wrong. In contrast to the no-memory
assumption of the early modeis, Levine's theory assumed that
subjects do eliminate hypotheses from the pool, at least for same
time. In the course of time, subjects may forget that same of the
hypotheses were not confirmed. These hypotheses then become
part of the pool again. The weight of empirical evidence supports
Levine's theory (e.g. Levine, 1975; De Swart & Das-Smaal, 1976,~
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1979a, 1979b; Boume, Dominowski, & Loftus, 1979; Das-Smaal &
De Swart, 1981; De Swart, Kok, & Das-Smaal, 1981).
De Swart and Das-Smaal (1976, 1979a, 1979b) argued that
SokoIov's (1969) model of the orienting reflex is a neural analogue
of the cognitive process of hypothesis testing. The authors (1979b)
found that the amplitude of the Skin Conductance Response (SCR)
was higher when feedback during category leaming confirmed a
categorization response in which subjects had low confidence as
compared with one on which they reported high confidence.
Refutation revealed the opposite result: SCR was higher followïng a
high-confidence categorization than following a low-confidence
categorization. A study by De Swart, Kok and Das-Smaal (1981)
replicated these results with the amplitude of P300 as a measure of
changes in the probability of hypotheses.
The findings of Das-Smaal (1986) mentioned earlier on the
storage and use of information on frequency of occurrence in a
categorization learning task can be reconciled with hypothesis
testing theory by the assumption that frequency information is used
to select hypotheses. Haygood et al. (1970) e.g., and more recently
Kellogg (1980), have provided evidence of this view. One special
theory on hypothesis formation, Levine's (1969) multi-hypothesis
sampling theory, was supported in a study by Das-Smaal and De
Swart (1981). An illustration of multi-hypothesis sampling in a real-
life situation was given by Reed (1982). Reed describes how
hypothesis testing is applied to a task that involves diagnosing
medical problems. Results on how physicians attempt to diagnose a
disease agree with LeVine's theory. It appeared that physicians start
to form hypotheses early in the examination. Then they monitor a
subset of about three hypotheses at a time, and this subset remains
fairly constant through different stages of examination. The results
show that more than one hypothesis or expectation can be active
and evaluated simultaneously.
3.8 Task demands
Ease of interpretation of new impressions is not the only
function of categories. Categories are essential in thinking and
problem solving. They also make conversation more easy, at least if
the involved categories have names and are subject to general
agreement within a culture. Regarding categories. many cognitive
judgments are possible. Das-Smaal and De Swart (1984, 1986)
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presented their subjects, following category learning, with test tasks
of different kinds. These were e.g. a categorization task and a task
in which subjects were asked to choose the more representative
one of two stimuli for the focal category. Differential performance
on focal category exemplars, in partlcular those of lower total cue
validity, was found consistently between these two tasks in all
experiments. The results were taken to suggest thai frequency in a
contrast category is weighted more heavily in categorization tasks
than in tasks thai require judgments of the representativeness of
exemplars relative to the focal category. Unlike in categorization
decisions, differences among categories are not so much the issue
in the latter kind of task. Therefore, distinctiveness, as determined
by occurrence in contrast categories, is deemed less important and
receives less weight. This is not to say thai the effect of occurrence
in a contrast category is not important at a1l in a paired comparisons
task. Studies have shown thai it i§. important to a certain extent.
However, the fact thai the above disparity showed up repeatedly
points to the relevance of task analysis. ComparabIe effects of task
demands in categorization versus subsequent justification of a
categorization decision are described by Medin and Smith (1984)
and Landau (1984). Also, the results of Kemler Nelson (1984) and
of Ward and Scott (1987) are very interesting in this respect. They
found the same task effect as described above. In a traditional
category learning task (intentional learning) , subjects appeared
especially to attend to the feature thai maximized the difference
between categories. For certain reasons, the intentional learning
task in this study was compared with an incidental learning task.
The latter task in fact boiled down to pairwise comparisons. The
instruction was to determine which one of two exemplars was most
typical of a category. In this task, in contrast to the categorization
task, subjects granted no extra weight to the distinctive feature.
A post-hoc interpretation of the findings on a more
elementary level of theorizing may serve to integrate the results of
Das-Smaal (1986) on frequency of occurrence in different tasks.
Suppose the following. As a part of a momentary activation pattern,
features activate categories in which they have occurred to the
extent corresponding to the previously registered frequency of
occurrence. Thus, a common feature occurring of ten in the focal
category but also in a contrast category activates bath the focal and
the contrast category, although the focal category will be activated
more. A distinctive feature, however, occurring of ten in the focal
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but never in a contrast category. activates only the foca! category. It
is furthermore assumed that contrasting categories inhibit each
other when they are activated. a suggestion made by Wickelgren
(1981) and Rumelhart and McClelland (1982). It follows that the
net activation of the focal category will be higher due to a distinctive
feature than to a common feature. even if they occur with the same
frequency in the foca! category. as in the Das-Smaal (1986) studies.
In a categorization task. the decision may then involve
determination of which one of the categories at stake is activated
most. A pairwise comparison task. on the other hand. concentrates
on the focal category. It involves determining which one of the two
exemplars is more strongly related to the foca! category. In such a
task the foca! category may be primed. and this diminishes the
relative influence of inhibition by way of the contrast category.
The issue of task-dependence is. of course. not a new one in
psychology. The point is that not much attention bas been paid to
the influence of task differences on the conclusions reached in
much of the experimental research on categorization. One
interesting implication of the findings on task demands mentioned
above is that information on frequency in the focal category and
information on frequency in contrast categories bas to be separately
accessible in memory. and not already joined in the measure of cue
validity. Cue validity. then. may be either computed when
necessary. or stored in addition to frequencies in the focal and
contrast categories. Perhaps what is required is a distinction like
the one made by Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) between
categories and procedures for using categories. Having knowledge
of occurrence in contrasting categories does not imply that this
knowledge is a!ways used to perform.
Thus the contention that a category consists of certain
features is not enough. It does not say how those features are
weighted or integrated when people use that category in same
particular situation. An account is needed of the manner in which a
whole is constructed from the parts in each case. And as for
storage. the information must be stored in such a way that it enables
us to use that information in a flexible way. Task and contextual
factors may give rise to a kind of momentary relevant activation
pattern in which certain values may temporarily be of more
importance than others.
The results indicate the importance of knowing which
demands a task places on the subject. The effect of task difference
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shows that category information can be used in a flexible way. It is
not very likely that all aspects of category representation can be
investigated in one single type of task. Which demands are made by
the various tasks in the current research paradigms is not yet clear.
Systematic analysis and categorization of tasks is thereforenecessary. 
In the future. this may prevent research partiality.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, a number of important theoretical approaches
have been presented regarding the question of how people are
biased in the way they divide up the world into categories. In
addition, experimentally established sources of bias were analysed.
Overall, perhaps the most striking observation in this overview is
the fact that many of the constraints on human categorization
behavior described in the principal theoretical altematives seem to
be implicated. The point is that they do not all occur under the
same conditions, and there is a lack of knowledge about the way in
which they are combined. There is evidence indicating the
abstraction of schemas or prototypes, learning of feature frequencies
bath of the focal and contrast categories from the same domain,
sensitivity to correlations among features, exemplar representation,
category width effects, hypothesis testing, effects of selective
attention, and for the very important role served by context, task
and background knowledge and ideas. These processes serve to
create a knowledge base regarding categories that can be activated
in a flexible way. Categorization behavior then may be regarded as
the result of same computational process which appears to be
influenced by the cognitive constructs that we personally entertain
in relation to the to-be-categorized object, the task at hand or the
goal of the categorization activity, and the context in which it takes
place. All of the factors mentioned above can bias Dur categorization
behavior in certain directions. It is a matter of further investigation
to determine their boundary conditions.
5. 
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